Tuesday 3 May 2016

OBSERVATORIUM HELVETICACA

RISE UP FOLKS!!!

ANOTHER UNTRUTH FROM THE SWISS ILLITARIANS: http://www.20min.ch/schweiz/news/story/11332358
Our case reported in December 2015 seems not to exist...and sure many more...LIES OVER LIES!

Last letter to the miltary justice dept Goerrlichs who obviously are in contact with the local harassers as they kept more distance afterwards but they are still here and spy on us 24/7 and truly think in their completly brainwashed zombie brains that this is totally justified and normal. Their judgement day will come. Sooner than later. And hatered and death is all they will reap:
Guten Tag. Wir werden hier immer noch von diesen hoch kriminellen Tätergruppen extrem belagert und auch mit eindeutig professionellen Frequenzwaffen regelmässig und massiv bestrahlt bzw. gefoltert. Es sind hier auch kleine Kinder im Haus und wir sind alle keine Terroristen. Falls das nicht augenblicklich aufhört, werden hier ausführliche Frequenzmessungen gemacht und Sie und dieser ganze Terroristenverein der Armee auf Schadensersatz verklagt. Diese Folter zielt darauf ab Menschen so zu schwächen damit sie krank werden und sterben. Ich ertrage das nun schon seit über 3 Jahren nur weil ich einen haarsträubenden Menschenhandelsfall und die damit verbundenen Verbrechen gemeldet habe. Wenn man in der Schweiz neuerdings legal mit Menschen handeln und diese zu Tode foltern darf, geben Sie mir doch bitte Bescheid, dann machen wir das in Zukunft auch. Zeitig zur Lynchjustiz, die bei Komplettversagen jeglicher Gerechtigkeit wohl zum Tragen kommen und durch das Volk vollstreckt wird. Mit mir hat das wenig zu tun und ich lasse mir für die Fehler der Regierung auch nicht mein Leben zerstören. Entweder sie sind für das Volk oder dagegen und wie man hier mit normalen Bürgern umgeht, ist wirklich unter aller Sau und ich werde dies auch nicht mehr länger hinnehmen. Jegliche Kooperation und Kommunikation ist hiermit für alle Zeiten beendet und Sie werden in diesem Zusammenhang dann von anderen Stellen wieder hören. Diese gezielte und missbräuchliche Staatsfolter, Staatsüberwachung und Staatsvergiftung ist untragbar geworden und ein Verbrechen an der ganzen Bevölkerung.

http://www.spyemporium.com/counter-surveillance-measure-detector.html
http://rfexplorer.com/models/

ANTI-SURVEILLANCE:
That this iconographic robot-person has a cannonball bomb with a lit fuse for a head represents the explosive volatility of the situation: viewing people as threats to be monitored and controlled, rather than as citizens with civil rights, may destroy civil society and/or may lead to violent opposition.

The section on methods of attack is the most provocative. The methods described are placing around cameras plastic bags filled with glue, affixing stickers or tape over camera lenses, shooting cameras with children’s highpowered water gun toys filled with paint, temporarily disabling lenses with laser pointers, cutting CCTV cables with axes or garden tools, and dropping concrete blocks on cameras from rooftops. Rather than simply describing methods for disabling video surveillance cameras, however, the instructions reveal a pattern of values and an engaging subtext about camera destruction as an embodied social practice. Thus, methods that draw public attention to the surveillance systems or that reveal cameras as inoperable (such as shooting them with paint guns) are preferred to those that do not heighten public awareness (such as disabling cameras with a laser pointer). Along these lines, regarding the method of bagging cameras, the site says: ‘‘To Bag a camera theres a high chance that you can reach it with ease. If this is the case dont hesitate to smash the glass, lens and any other components. Dont bag it afterwards, people need to see the units smashed’’ (spelling errors and abbreviations are accurate to the website and serve to reinforce the low-tech aesthetic).

‘‘iSEE v.911: ‘Now more than ever.’’’
Once past the opening scene, the application presents the user with a street map of Manhattan with a dramatic black background and abundant red boxes indicating areas under video surveillance. The map is engaged by clicking first on a starting point and second on a destination point. After a few seconds of calculation, a yellow route is indicated for a person to travel the path of least surveillance to his or her destination.

The guide to camera destruction, on the other hand, encourages resistance against public surveillance through low-tech, neo-Luddite attacks. Both forms of counter-surveillance, however, focus their attention and critique on the technologies of surveillance, which act as material representations of large-scale monitoring regimes. Neither of them directly targets the public and private institutions that are mobilizing surveillance or the individuals within these institutions.

The IAA’s information page for iSee mobilizes social science research on surveillance, complete with academic citations, to thoroughly document trends toward increased abuse of marginalized groups with video surveillance, most notably of minorities, women, youth, outsiders (such as the homeless), and activists. Part of the reason that the technologies lend themselves to these uses, the site explains, is that policies for surveillance oversight, access, or retention are either purposely opaque or nonexistent; this is especially true in the United States because so much public surveillance in that country is conducted by private companies, so the equipment and footage is privately owned. Of course, it should be pointed out that, regardless of regulation or oversight, the technologies themselves insulate the operators from immediate, if not all, scrutiny, thereby encouraging widespread voyeurism of women (Norris and Armstrong 1997; Koskela 2000; Rosen 2001) and profiling of racial and other minorities (Lyon 2001).

It is doubtful that police or security forces are intentionally manipulating spaces and bodies with surveillance and other strategies because they explicitly wish to neutralize democratic opportunities; in fact, they most likely believe that their actions of social control are preserving democracy by safeguarding the status quo (Monahan 2006b).

[In control societies], individuals become ‘dividuals,’ and masses become samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’ … Disciplinary man produced energy in discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits
(Deleuze 1995)

To bring to light what is ‘the hidden’ par excellence, what escapes the gaze of science because it is hidden in the very gaze of the scientist, the transcendental unconscious, one has to historicize the subject of historicization, to objectivate the subject of the objectivation … To be able to apply to their own practice the objectivation techniques that they apply to the other sciences, sociologists have to convert reflexivity into a disposition constitutive of their scientific habitus, a reflexivity reflex.

However, static surveillance — when carried out properly — is difficult to detect because good surveillance operatives blend in with their surroundings and make themselves as innocuous as possible. As creatures of habit, most people get used to their surroundings, and fail to notice things they see every day. By blending in with the scenery the subject sees every day, such as the local neighborhood or route taken every morning to work, the operative can effectively become invisible. Because of this, static surveillance requires a high degree of situational awareness — and a certain amount of paranoia — to detect.

Although static surveillance is the hardest type to detect and counter, it is expensive — as it can involve renting apartments, stores, street vendor kiosks and carts and other similar observation posts, known as “perches” in surveillance jargon. Because the operatives do not move, static surveillance requires that operatives be perched at close intervals so that they can keep a constant eye on the target. In general, only governments have the manpower and resources necessary to do this type of surveillance properly.

Mobile surveillance can be carried out in two ways: in vehicles or on foot. A wider area can be covered in vehicular surveillance — and is vital if the subject is traveling by car — although this type of surveillance does have limitations. Should the subject go into an office building, a subway or a shopping mall, for example, the operatives in the vehicle cannot follow. Because of this limitation, vehicular surveillance is usually carried out in conjunction with foot surveillance. The operatives on foot are in communication with the operatives in the vehicle. In addition, the operatives in the vehicle will often drop off one of their team to continue following the target. Mixed car/foot operations are effective because the target more often will focus on other pedestrians rather than the cars around him.

Environmental activists, animal rights activists, anarchists and anti-globalization activists frequently surveil their subjects before staging a protest or “direct action” operations. Groups that target corporations for sabotage, such as the Earth Liberation Front, are especially sophisticated in the use of technical surveillance.
The Ruckus Society is a group devoted to training activists in “electronic scouting” — technical surveillance involving the use of remote cameras, GPS locators, frequency counters, programmable scanners and night-vision goggles. Program graduates, then, utilize high-tech equipment such as miniature remote cameras and “bionic ear” listening devices to conduct their surveillance. These activists frequently use programmable scanners and cameras to monitor security/ police communications and activity in order to warn the saboteurs of an impeding response by law enforcement.

The bubble also provides protection against any erratic move the target might utilize to determine if he is being watched, or to ditch the surveillance. Therefore, if the team senses that the target has begun to “stairstep” (a series of deliberate turns intended to expose a surveillance team) through a residential neighborhood with very little activity on the street, the team using the bubble can wait outside the area instead of following the target through the maneuvers. Teams using a bubble will also frequently change “the eye” (the person directly watching the target) so that the target does not see the same face or vehicle twice.

Again, in almost all cases, only a government has the resources and training to effectively provide this highest level of surveillance coverage.

In order to conduct surveillance uninterrupted over a long period of time, a combination of static and vehicular surveillance is often employed. Static surveillance operatives will stake out the subject’s location — perhaps renting an apartment across the street from the person’s home, and then give a “call out” to the mobile surveillance team when the subject moves. The static operative will advise the mobile team what direction the subject is going and if the subject is on foot or in a vehicle.

Physical surveillance — especially on a surveillance-aware target — is extremely difficult to carry out effectively, as it requires a great deal of training and practical experience. Criminals and terrorists who attempt to pull off an effective tail often lack the street skills to be effective, and often make mistakes that tip off the target. Because their objective can be to ambush — to kill or kidnap the subject — spotting physical surveillance is of critical importance.

Role playing is an important aspect of undercover surveillance work — and those who attempt it without sufficient training often make mistakes that can alert their subject to the fact that they are being watched, or raise the suspicions of law enforcement or countersurveillance teams.

The purpose of using good cover for action and cover for status is to make the operative’s presence look routine and normal. When done right, the operative fits in with the mental snapshot subconsciously taken by the subject as he goes about his business. Inexperienced surveillance operative, or those without adequate resources, can be easily detected and their cover blown.

An acronym used by government agencies when training operatives in effective surveillance is TEDD: Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor. Failure to take into account these four elements is another amateurish mistake that can get the operative caught. The factors of time, environment and distance are important because a subject who notices the same person hovering around again and again at different times and locations is more likely to become aware that he is being watched. Demeanor refers to lack of cover or simply bad body language — which also can alert a subject to the presence of a surveillance team.

Victims of planned hostile actions — such as kidnappings or killings — almost always are closely monitored by their attackers in advance of the operation. Such pre-operational surveillance enables the plotters to determine the best method of attack, as well as the best time and place to carry it out. Savvy countersurveillance, however, can go a long way toward thwarting a hostile act.

The cardinal rule for personal safety is for people to be aware of their surroundings at all times and to observe the behavior of others in the area. However, detecting surveillance — especially when it is performed well — often requires that one take extra precautions. One of the best ways for a person to determine whether he or she is being tailed is to use a surveillance detection route (SDR). By altering their behavior, those under surveillance can manipulate the situation, causing members of the surveillance team to act in ways that betray their presence and intentions. In fact, understanding that a potential victim can manipulate a surveillance situation is one of the most important lessons to be gleaned from this series.

Physical threats to individuals from terrorists, assassins, kidnappers or even stalkers are site-dependant. The assailants choose the location and timing of their attack based on criteria that gives them the best chance of successfully carrying out the attack and — unless the attacker is mentally disturbed or on a suicide mission — of escaping. These criteria include restricting or controlling the target’s ability to maneuver or escape, and providing optimal cover for any surveillance or attack team.

Security is vital to the success & survival of the resistance movement. This is because we have an enemy who actively works to undermine, neutralize, & ultimately destroy us. Failure to remain aware of security concerns can mean the difference between victory or defeat, freedom or imprisonment, life or death. Not only for yourself, but others around you. Information gathered from various sources, & that is subjected to analysis & comparison, is called intelligence. The gathering of intelligence is a vital part of counter-insurgency operations, without which the enemy does not know who, what, where or when to strike.

Security & Counter-Surveillance measures are designed to limit & deny the flow of information to enemy forces. It is based on the principle that counter-insurgency is a permanent part of society and that those engaged in resistance are always vulnerable to surveillance & repression.

Surveillance is the continuous, secretive observation of persons, places, things or objects, in order to gain information. There are two types of surveillance: physical & technical. Physical surveillance is carried out by enemy personnel on foot and/or by vehicle. It is the only way a target person can be continuously observed over an extended period of time. Surveillance teams can be comprised of two persons in one vehicle, or a dozen operators in six vehicles (or even more, of course). In addition, motorcycles, bikes, planes & helicopters may also be used.

In this category we must also consider informants, infiltrators & collaborators. They may be police agents, civilians recruited by police, or former comrades. This form of physical surveillance is the main source of intelligence on people’s thoughts, plans & activities. It is sometimes referred to as ‘human intelligence’. Because of the sensitive nature of personal information they are able to gather, and their ability to influence events, infiltrators & informants are especially dangerous.

Technical surveillance is far more common. With widespread use of telecommunications (phone, cell, pager, internet, fax), technical surveillance is a main source of intelligence on a person’s day to day activities, contacts, personal relationships, etc. More generally, it consists of technical devices to record, document or monitor a target individual’s movements, conversations, or activities. This
includes listening devices in homes & cars, tapped telephones, monitoring of internet activity, CCTV video, tracking devices, night-vision devices, etc.

In rural areas, physical surveillance is more often necessary due to the lack of telecommunications, roads, etc. Low population densities also serve to identify surveillance operators as ‘outsiders’. For these reasons, physical surveillance in rural areas often requires long-range observation (by ground teams, aircraft, or satellite in high priority situations). In some cases, police in military-style camouflage secretly conduct surveillance at a much closer range.

Teams may set up OPs on overlooking hills or mountainsides, using hi-powered long-range cameras & telescopes, or in nearby forest, abandoned buildings, fields, bushes, etc. Operators may wear camouflage clothing, including 'ghillie suits', and construct camouflaged hide positions (digging out an area large enough to lie in, setting up overhead support, and covering it with the top layer of earth).

Confirming surveillance can often be difficult. It is usually done to determine if surveillance exists (in order to evade it). For this reason, obvious surveillance detection should be avoided. If operators think a target is engaging in counter-surveillance, they may become more sophisticated in their approach, and may believe the target is going to carry out some ‘illegal’ activity.

In most cases, surveillance operators will withdraw if they believe they have been detected. Surveillance itself may be stopped. In other situations, surveillance teams may maintain command of the target even if detected (overt surveillance). Obvious surveillance by police is sometimes used to intimidate targets as part of a larger psychological warfare operation, usually designed to neutralize the target through fear and paranoia.

Informants and infiltrators are spies who gather information on the resistance & provide it to the enemy. They may also take a more active role. These acts can result in capture, arrests, imprisonment, and death. The term collaborator is used for any member or citizen who aids or assists our enemy.

Informants & infiltrators provide unique & special human intelligence (i.e., emotional states, plans, intentions, etc.) which can be gained in no other way. In addition, infiltrators & collaborators can physically disrupt & sabotage movement activities. They can spread disinformation & poisonous gossip, creating division and paranoia. They can also record incriminating statements and actions. Overall, they are an essential & active element in counter-insurgency operations as well as criminal investigations.

Informants are persons recruited by the state security forces to provide information. They are civilians, usually friends or associates of the target group. They could be embittered comrades who feel isolated or even betrayed by the group. Or, they could be genuine members arrested and subject
to pressure. Police refer to them as 'Confidential Informants' or 'Confidential Sources'.

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