GET A LIFE!
By ACM IV SECURITY SERVICES - PART I
Surveillance Principals generally fall into three categories: soft, hard and overt.
The soft target is one who, based on his status and background, is not expected to suspect surveillance coverage. This assumes that he has had no training in countermeasures and is not likely to employ them as standard practice. A soft target is not involved in any illegal or clandestine activity and, therefore, should have no reason to suspect surveillance coverage.
The hard target is one who can be expected to be surveillance-concious, based upon his status and background. A hard target represents a more sophisticated challenge to a surveillance team because he is expected to have had formal countermeasures training and might employ them during his travels as standard practice. Common examples of hard targets are espionage agents and terrorist operatives, both of which are thoroughly trained in surveillance countermeasure tactics and employ them constantly in order to survive.
An overt target is one who, based solely on his present status, is expected to be surveillance-concious and employ countermeasures as standard practice. The overt target represents the greatest challenge to the surveillance team because he can be expected to be more aggressive or overt in his actions. The most common example of an overt target is an espionage agent operating under official diplomatic status out of official mission or embassies. Such targets assume that surveillance coverage is present and will conduct a thorough ritual of surveillance detection and antisurveillance maneuvers prior to conducting any operational activity.
Physical surveillance is the systematic, discreet observation of an individual to develop information regarding his activities. It differs from technical surveillance in that the surveillance operators must observe the principal physically. It is the only means by which a principal can be observed constantly over an extended period of time.
A professional and effective surveillance is orchestrated in a systematic manner. This is accomplished through tactics that will ensure discreet coverage of a principal. A surveillance operation can only be effective if it goes undetected by the principal or anyone else, such as neighbors, associates, employees, passersby, and so on.
Fixed surveillance consists of observing the principals activities at a specified location from static position. Such operations will only satisfy specific objectives because they provide limited insight into the principals overall activities. They are normally employed when it is suspected that the principal will conduct protected activities at a specific location, such as his residence, his workplace, and associates residence, or an establishment he frequents.
Mobile surveillance is employed to satisfy any objectives of physical surveillance that cannot be accomplished through a fixed operation. In mobile surveillance operations, the surveillance team observes the principals activities while he is traveling. Of course, this requires that the surveillance operators and vehicles move with him. Mobile surveillance operations are conducted either on foot, by vehicle, or with a combination of both.
Communication equiment is critical to the vehicular surveillance team. The ability of all the surveillance vehicles to communicate allows them to rely on the transmissions of the command vehicle to guide their activities. This enables team members to maneuver effectively without having to rely on their visual observations of the principal or other surveillance vehicles. A surveillance vehicle normally has two operators, a driver and a navigator. The navigator reads a map and directs the driver. When in the command vehicle position, the navigator transmits the principals location and actions to the entire team.
Foot surveillance at night provides the surveillance team with an enhanced degree of concealment. The darkness is of great benefit to the foot surveillance operator, but it can also be of great benefit to a principal who is attempting to elude suveillance. Surveillance operators can maximize the advantage of darkness employing night vision equipment.
The number of public locations to which the principal may lead the surveillance team is unlimited, including restaurant, stores, malls, parks, and airports. Public locations offer varying degrees of cover, which is critical due to the confined operating area. A surveillance team is particularly vulnerable to exposure in public locations because there is a higher propability of unexpected maneuvers.
Combined foot and vehicular surveillance operations employ all mobile surveillance disciplines comprehensively. Such operations are conducted to observe all of the principals activities during a specific period. They require that the entire team possesses a high degree of tactical and technical expertise to ensure an effective transition between vehicular and foot surveillance. Obviously, such operations increase the exposure of operators and vehicles to the principal. Long-term operations will normally require that both be replaced throughout to maintain security.
Surveillance on mass transit systems such as subways or metros is the most difficult kind. Even when surveillance operators have body communications equipent, they will be unable to communicate from the station to the team outside. Multiple train exchanges will virtually destroy team integrity. For this reason, the foot surveillance team will attempt to place as many operators on the train with the principal as possible, entering with him and exiting behind him, to maintain integrity and a surveillance capability at his destination.
Technical surveillance is the use of technical electronic equipment to monitor or record the activities of the principal. Activities can be monitored by video, audio, or motion detection. Activities are primarily recorded by means of video or audio tape, but techniques such as intercepting facsimile transmissions or down-loading computer data banks may also be used.
One method of audio surveillance that does not require access to the target area uses a light system that transmits a laser beam modulated by audible sounds into the target area. Such a system requires a line of sight, ideal weather conditions, and a reflective surface in the target area to direct the light back to a specialized receiver for signal demodulation. This system is most effective when the reflective surface is inside the target area, but a window on the perimeter can also be used. Microwave signals are also used to capture and transmit audio impulses through a reflective beam, although this method differs from laser transmissions in that microwave beams can penetrate physical barriers other than glass. Another method that does not require physical access to the target area uses a directional microphone or parabolic dish. All of these techniques require line of sight, they are relatively ineffective against structurally contained areas and so are employed primarily in open terrain.
Radio frequency (RF)-transmitted audio devices consist of a microphone coupled with a transmitter. Such a device will transmit the audio signal to a remote listening post. The listening post must be located within the transmission range of the device, and the degradation to transmission range resulting from structural, atmospheric, and electromagnetic interference must be factored in. Another form of telephone monitoring not necessarily associated with tapping is the intercept of cordless and cellular telephone transmissions. Cordless telephones are the least secure means for telephone conversations because they can be intercepted by a standard frequency scanner. Cellular telephones normally require additional expertise and equipment for intercept, but they are nonetheless vulnearble.
The tracking system will inform the surveillance effort of when the principal is moving, his direction of travel, and his distance from the receiver. Since the tracking device must be collocated with the principal in one way or another, the most common application is to place it on the principal vehicle. Rarely will the surveillance team have the opportunity to place the tracking device directly on the principal, but another possibility is to place it in a personal belonging that the principal frequently carries, such as a briefcase.
Another method of physical monitoring is thermal imaging. This is the use of passive infrared equipment that detects and amplifies electromagnetic energy emitted as radiated heat and converts it into a visible form. Thermal imaging is used primarily for tactical surveillance applications to scan large areas and detect the radiated heat of people and machinery. Specialized thermal equipment can also be used to monitor the movement of a principal inside a denied structure such as a building or house.
Automation systems are most vulnerable to technical surveillance because any computer in the system can be accessed by any other computer in the system. Additionally, the lines of communication, normally telephone lines, that connect the network can be penetrated at any point to gain access to the system. A surveillance team may gain access to a target computer through an unprotected computer in the system. With some technical expertise, a surveillance team can penetrate the systems transmission lines and determine the access codes necessary to enter the target computer through either technical analysis or trial and error.
A surveillance team can receive information from a target computer that is in use through the exploitation of compromising emanations. Computers radiate electromagentic pulses from the screen and other components when in use. By using technical equipment that isolates the frequency of the target computers radiations, a surveillance team can in effect read the computer monitor from a remote location.
Observation is the act of seeing or fixing the mind upon something for the purpose of recognizing and retaining some fact or occurrence. It is conducted through the bodys senses of perception. Perception is an individuals awareness of the elements of environment, gained through physical sensation in reaction to sensory stimulus. Sensory stimulus is perceived by the bodys senses, which consist of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste.
Personal interests are conditioned throughout a lifetime, and to expand observation beyond those requires a concious and focused effort. Perception is also limited by an individuals base of knowledge. The mind tends to either subconciously filter out items and occurences for which there is no frame of reference which to describe them in known terms or retain them for subsequent retrieval. An individual must be constantly aware of these tendencies in order to overcome their impact on observation.
For the purpose of surveillance detection , the primary objective of observation of surrounding individuals is to retain their characteristics - consisting of features, form, dress, and mannerisms - for later recognition.
Passive physical surveillance detection is conducted during the course of the principals standard activities, when no unusual action is being taken. Recall that the very nature of physical surveillance dictates that the surveillance team risks a degree of exposure to the principal. This possibility of exposure exists regardless of the principals actions. The principal should also incorporate the perceived objectives of the operation. Although the possible objectives of a surveillance operation are unlimited, they may involve developing evidence for legal prosecution or other purposes, identifying protected activity that can be used against the interest of the principal, or developing information that can be exploited as leverage against the principal in interrogation or negotiation. Identification of the oppositions possible operational objectives is normally as simple as identifying potential adversaries and the purposes for which they might employ surveillance. Although surveillance detection is a worth-while practice as a standard security precaution even when no surveillance is suspected, a logically conceived perspective regarding protected information and activities that potential adversaries might seek to observe provides a degree of the focus to the effort.
Recall that with a fully integrated surveillance team, a number of seperate surveillance vehicles will observe the principal at different periods throughout the mbobile follow. This dictates that the principal concentrate not only on one or two propable vehicles, but any number of vehicles. Also recall that a comprehensive surveillance effort does not comprise only one trip or day in the life of the principal. This dictates that the principal remember for extended periods any vehicles he observes that fit the profile of a surveillance vehicle. For instance, if the principal observes a suspected surveillance vehicle and then observes it two weeks later at an unrelated location, he has virtually confirmed that he is under surveillance.
Convoying is an indicator of surveillance which is detectable on roadways that afford the principal a long look back at following traffic, such as highwas and rural roads. Convoing is the tendency for surveillance vehicles to maintain an equal distance between each other. Obviously this tendency is only detectable when the terrain allows the principal to observe more vehicles pass by. Streets with a long downward slope provide optimal terrain for observing for convoying vehicles and other indicators of vehicular surveillance. The characteristics of darkness which faciliate the observation of vehicle lights from a distance also enhance the detectionof convoying vehicles on appropriate terrain.
Both mobile and fixed progressive surveillance employ the concept of decision points, which are locations that give the principal the option to turn or continue straight. The most common decision points are street intersections. A fixed progressive surveillance operation is composed of static observation points established at designated decision points. Since this involves no surveillance assets traveling with the principal, few of the surveillance detection vulnerabilities addressed throughout this chapter exist. Again, the detection of fixed progressive surveillance is driven by the target pattern analysis process. The principal will identify possible decision points where fixed surveillance assets may be located. When approaching and passing through identified decision points, the principal will observe for vehicles or foot operators in fixed surveillance positions.
When traveling on a train or bus, the principal should observe all individuals for subsequent recognition. Many trains are compartmented, which will assist in the isolation of potential surveillance operators on the train are not limited to those traveling within observation range of the principal. Longer rides will give the principal more opportunities to identify individuals who may be giving him more attention than is warranted or appear conspicous in some other way.
In some circumstances a surveillance team may select to place a surveillance operator "up against" the principal. This refers to the tactic of actually having a surveillance operator establish contact and rapport with the principal, taking advantage of the natural occurence of chance contacts with strangers that is characteristic of such travels. This gives the "harmless stranger" an opportunity to gain exceptional insight into the principals demeanor. as well as eliciting information that may be of value to the surveillance team.
Active physical surveillance detection consists of specific, normally preplanned maneuvers executed by the principal to elicit a reaction from a surveillance asset. By orchestrating an unanticipated situation to which the surveillance asset must react, the principal isolated that asset for identification. As with passive detection, active physical surveillance detection is based on knowledge of how a surveillance team operates. Such an understanding allows the principal to employ active measures that will invoke compromising actions by surveillance assets.
Active surveillance detection will rarely expose surveillance with each maneuver. In most cases, the principal will at best develop specific indicators to focus on for observation and retention. For instance, although a surveillance detection maneuver may elicit a suspicous reaction from a nearby vehicle, it is normally not until that vehicle is observed subsequently at an incoincidential location that surveillance can be confirmed.
A surveillance team depends on communication for a secure and coordinated effort. Most operationally capable surveillance teams will depend on radio communications equipment during all aspects of its surveillance operations. The communications equipment a team may employ ranges from hand-held radios to discreetly installed vehicular communications systems. Regardless of the degree of sophistication, all radio communications systems transmit radio frequency signals into the atmopshere. Although in most cases this is a surveillance teams greatest vulnerability to detection, it must be accepted because of the importance of a communications capability.
The principal should acquire the equipment needed to capitalize on the vulnerabilities inherent in surveillance communications. Rather than getting involved with more sophisticated communications detection equipment, however, radio frequency scanners are all that should be necessary. A limitation of commercially purchased frequency scanners is that they are designed to monitor only those frequencies authorized by federal regulations. A surveillance team concerned with the vulnerability of communications to frequency scanners will operate on radio frequencies outside the range of standard scanning equipment. In fact, many federal restrictions regulating the use and monitoring of certain frequency ranges are in place to protect the security of law enforcement and intelligence operations such as surveillance.
Commercial frequency scanners can be modified to receive restricted frequencies with some research. This information is available in various electronics publications. Electronics enthusiasts with this and other knowledge are not difficult to find. It is worthwhile to establish a relationship with an employee of an electronics equipment business. Once one has established rapport, such individuals are excellent sources of information regarding technical equipment applications and the frequencies used in a given area for particular purposes.
Two frequency scanners are ideal for surveillance detection purposes. A fixed scanner should be used in the residence to monitor activity in the general vicinity. This is propably the most effective means of detecting surveillance communications because much of a surveillance operation is based around the principals residence. From this location the principal can discreetly dedicate the necessary time to scan the spectrum and identify communications activity of interest. He should also use a mobile scanner when travelling by vehicle. This is most effective when used to monitor frequencies or frequency ranges that have been identified to be of interest through fixed scanning efforts.
Surveillance teams may use encrypted communications to maintain the security of their acitivites. Encrypted, or encoded, communications are scrambled in a manner that restricts their reception to radios that are programmed to decrypt the transmissions. The technology does exist to decrypt scrambled transmissions, but such a capability is beyond the expertise and financial means of most people. Encrypted communications are effective in protecting specific information regarding a surveillance operation, but they are as vulnerable to detection as unsecured transmissions. When encrypted communications transmit over the radios frequency, only static can be received by a radio that is not programmed for decryption. Although this protects the actual details of the conversation, it does reveal the fact that the frequency is being used for communications.
In residential areas it is relatively easy to isolate possible observation post locations through the process of elimination. Although law enforcement or national investigative agencies may commission the cooperation of a neighbor to set up an observation post, this is rarely done. In a residential area where the principal knows the neighbors, or is at least aware of who resides at specific residences, it is easy to eliminate locations as possible observation posts. In apartment complexes or commercial areas, the principal should be able to identify a number of possible locations for observation posts. When he has done so, the prinicpal will begin to observe the observers.
Surveillance operators manning an observation post will remain concealed inside the location to avoid any exposure to the principal. Therefore, the principal may detect such locations based on their conspicious inacitvity. Any rooms of possible observation post that are illuminate at night can be eliminated. The principal should observe for specific rooms that remain concealed during the day. By eliminating some rooms and identifying others as possible observation post locations in this way, the principal can then focus on future detection practices.
The same surveillance operators cannot remain inside a constant observation post indefinitly. Eventually observation post teams will exchange duties, leaving themselves vulnerable to detection. This exchange will normally take place in the middle of the night, even when it may seem more likely that this would occur during the day when the principal is away. The reason for this is that the surveillance team is not only trying to avoid drawing the attention of the principal but also that of neighbors who may become suspicious of unusual activity.
More aggressive active measures to be employed in the detection of observation posts include the use of infrared-detecting equipment to determine wether the opposition is using infrared devices. Another active measure is to have an anonymous package delivered to a suspected location with instructions to leave it at the door if there is no answer. This action may draw a surveillance operator to the door for observation, but it is likely that surveillance operators will leave the package in place and remain concealed. The principal will then continue constant observation of the package because a surveillance operator will eventually emerge, propably under concealment of darkness, and remove the package to restore a more natural appearance to the observation post location.
Even more aggressive measures include reporting an emergency, such as a civil disturbance, at the suspected observation post location. Since this is illegal, the principal should ensure that the distress call cannot be traced to its origin. While emergency personnel respond, the principal will observe to identify individuals occupying the location. Regardless of the result, the surveillance team will consider its observation post compromised and depart. This departure will be done without panic, in a manner which would draw no attention, and again, it will propably take place under the concealment of darkness.
Mobile surveillance systems may be used as observation posts when there are no fixed structures available to provide sufficient cover. Mobile observation posts normally take the form of a passenger van similar to others common to the area. Observation post vans may also have an official designation or commercial wording on the exterior to provide a plausible reason for their being in a particualr area. Vans with distinctive wording can only serve a limited purpose, however, because their extended presence will eventually appear suspicious. Mobile observation posts may also be established out of campers or trucks. A standard vehicle with remotely monitored video equipment can also be positioned as an observation post.
A fully integrated mobile system will be equipped with observation, video, and photographic equipment. The equipment will be installed so that surveillance operators inside can monitor surrounding activity without physically observing out of the vehicle.
If the principal is fortunate enough to observe a driver parking a vehicle without ever departing, he will have confirmed surveillance.
A more aggressive detection measure to be employed is to report a suspected vehicle to law enforcement authorites.The call should be made so it cannot be traced to the principal in case the surveillance asset happens to be a law enforcement agencys. The principal will observe as police officers approach the vehicle, possibly forcing out the surveillance operators. If the vehicle is in fact a surveillance asset but passed the scrunity of the police inquiry, the team will nevertheless consider it compromised and move it at the first secure opportunity. If the vehicle moves without ever being approached - or at least driven past - by police officers, the principal has confirmed that it was a law enforcement agency observation post vehcle.
When the stakeout location is situated in an apartment complex, the surveillance team may have more flexibility and concealment with which to establish a trigger position. When the principal resides at a hotel, the surveillance team may position a trigger operator inside the lobby to provide it with early warning regrading the principals activity and to inform it of the exit by which he is departing. When residing at a hotel, the principal should observe for individuals in stationary positions in the lobby or other common areas.
A surveillance may also attempt to get a room next to or the same floor as the principals. Although this is normally done to support technical surveillance operations, the team will also use this placement as a trigger for the physcial surveillance stakeout. An aggressive detection method can be employed in this situation is for the principal to stand in the hallway for a period of time after he exits and locks his room, observing for other guests who depart their room shortly after he does and identifying their room number.
Another aggressive detection maneuver is to depart the possible stakeout location, circle the block, and either return to the location or pass by and continue with the planned travel. This is a very overt detection measure because there is little logical reason for such a maneuver. The fact that it confounds logic precisely why it is effective. When the surveillance team is determining box locations, it bases the positioning of operators on roads which it does not epect the principal to use. Normally it will select one of the streets on the side of the block the stakeout is covering as a secure position, for the very reason that the principal would not logically circle his own block. This applies to either the block which the target location is actually on or the one on the opposite side of the streets, whichever is determined to be the principals least likely route of departure. This maneuver also provides a good opportunity for the principal to observe a trigger vehicle still in the box position or beginning to maneuver as the principal passes back by.
In relation to aggressive driving, a principal who establishes a pattern of using expedient shortcuts such as ducking into back streets or cutting through parking lots to avoid traffic signals has more flexibility in conducting surveillance detection maneuvers. Additionally, the principal who establishes a pattern of violating traffic laws such as taking illegal left-hand turns or running red lights when no traffic is coming opens additional surveillance detection options.
At the other extreme is slow and conservative driving. The principal who drives in this manner inherits some surveillance detection advantages as well. Here too, if the principal drives in a slow and conservative manner, the surveillance team is forced to conform to this pattern as well. If the principal drives 5 miles per hour below the speed limit, he may upset a number of other vehicles, but he can easily isolate following vehicles that are maneuvering in a similar manner.
Propably the most effective vehicular surveillance detection maneuver is the logical 180-degree turn. Note the term logical, implying that the circumstances of the turn should appear plausible to an observing surveillance team, if present.
One terrain feature that faciliates surveillance detection on highways is a rest area or a similar location such as a state welcome area or highway-side service station. As the principal exits the highway and enters a rest area, he will observe to the rear for any vehicles that enter behind him. He can then take a position in the rest area to observe any vehicles that enter shortly aftre him. He will also observe the reactions of vehicles as he departs.
A final option when using a highway exit ramp for detection is to exit, pass over the highway, and then reenter traveling in the opposite direction. This is an interesting challenge to a surveillance team, because in order to cover the principal in a tactically sound manner, the team will have to expose at least two and possibly three surveillance vehicles.
Traveling by taxi does not preclude active surveillance detection. Passive observation is difficult because the principal will not have the range of mirrors normally available. He has little to lose, however, by asking the taxi driver to observe for indications of surveillance and that assistance in detection will be rewarded. Taxi drivers are generally good sources for observation because they are familiar with standard traffic patterns and can readily identify anything that appears suspicious. If the principal is particuarly concerned with the possibility of surveillance, he can instruct the taxi driver in surveillance detection maneuvers. This also provides a somewhat plausible reason for the use of overt tactics, because the surveillance team will likely attribute aggressive maneuvers to the erratic driving typical of cab drivers.
One important note for this and all other foot surveillance detection maneuvers is that when observing possible surveillance operators at close range, the principal should avoid making eye contact. Surveillance operators are generally paranoid about compromise, and eye contact with the principal is viewed as an extreme degree of exposure. In many cases a surveillance operator will pull himself out of the operation if eye contact with the principal occurs. This has a negative impact on the effectiveness of surveillance detection, because if the surveillance operator withdraws from the operation after the principal gets a good look at him, the principal loses the opportunity to observe him later and confirm surveillance.
Countersurveillance is very characteristic of intelligence and law enforcement agency activities. When intelligence operatives meet with their agents, they commonly employ the support of countersurveillance to ensure that their activities are not compromised or that their contact is not a double-agent. Intelligence agencies will also employ the support of countersurveillance when they suspect that an agent is under surveillance. If surveillance is detected during countersurveillance coverage, the agency will confirm that the agent is compromised and either discontinue contact or incoroporate more secure means of contact and control. Law enforcement agencies commonly employ countersurveillance to ensure the security of their agents during undercover operations such as narcotics buys.
An extension of countersurveillance coverage that is extremly sophisticated and complex involves emplying countersurveillance to isolate a suspected surveillance operator and then following that individual to confirm surveillance and determine his identity. This is an aggressive measure to detect surveillance at its source. Obviously, it requires that countersurveillance operators be tactically capable surveillance operators as well.
Any location that incorporates specific types of security measures is effective for antisurveillance. This is based primarily on the fact that a surveillance team is not only concerned with detection by the principal but also by third parties. Security personnel or systems provide the third party for antisurveillance purposes. Even a surveillance team that is operating under official authorization must be sensitive to compromise by well-intentioned security personnel. Security personnel are trained and employed to identify suspicious activity, rendering any surveillance team vulnerable to detection. Additionally, security systems such as X-ray machines and metal detectors will obstruct or delay the entry of surveillance operators with communications equipment or firearms. Through prior planning the principal can exploit such locations for antisurveillance purposes.
Music masking can be used to conceal audio leakage that is detected by an audio amplifier or other means. Audio can escape a target area via pipes, conduits, air ducts, or simply through walls. Music masking distorts audio leakage by transmitting music through a network of speakers placed close to the source leakage. Radio or commercially programmed music should not be used for masking, such as local radio station, the surveillance team can record the same radio station transmissions and use them to filter the masking music out of audio intercepts. Alternatives to the use of commercially programmed music that can be similarly acquired and used for filtering include compiling a tape of various songs that would be difficult to duplicate. Another option is the use of classical music, which, although readily indentifiable by compositions, is difficult to distinguish by artist or recording product.
The world around us is a dangerous and hostile one. Wether spy versus spy, target versus terrorist, or you against the world, the keys to survival are the same. Although the enemy may not be readily apparent, accepting the fact that the enemy is everpresent is paramount to the preservation of personal security.
The underworld of crime and espionage is the battleground of shadow warriors who have survived in the face of the most sophisticated and hostile elements imaginable. Theirs is a highly predatory and often vicious world, of which the greater society is oblivious. These men without faces, and faces without names, will continue to fade anonymously into history and become lost in time like tears in the rain. It is truly unforutnate that their unrecorded episodes of intrigue and human confrontation will follow them into obscurity.
A surveillance team can receive information from a target computer that is in use through the exploitation of compromising emanations. Computers radiate electromagentic pulses from the screen and other components when in use. By using technical equipment that isolates the frequency of the target computers radiations, a surveillance team can in effect read the computer monitor from a remote location.
Observation is the act of seeing or fixing the mind upon something for the purpose of recognizing and retaining some fact or occurrence. It is conducted through the bodys senses of perception. Perception is an individuals awareness of the elements of environment, gained through physical sensation in reaction to sensory stimulus. Sensory stimulus is perceived by the bodys senses, which consist of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste.
Personal interests are conditioned throughout a lifetime, and to expand observation beyond those requires a concious and focused effort. Perception is also limited by an individuals base of knowledge. The mind tends to either subconciously filter out items and occurences for which there is no frame of reference which to describe them in known terms or retain them for subsequent retrieval. An individual must be constantly aware of these tendencies in order to overcome their impact on observation.
For the purpose of surveillance detection , the primary objective of observation of surrounding individuals is to retain their characteristics - consisting of features, form, dress, and mannerisms - for later recognition.
Passive physical surveillance detection is conducted during the course of the principals standard activities, when no unusual action is being taken. Recall that the very nature of physical surveillance dictates that the surveillance team risks a degree of exposure to the principal. This possibility of exposure exists regardless of the principals actions. The principal should also incorporate the perceived objectives of the operation. Although the possible objectives of a surveillance operation are unlimited, they may involve developing evidence for legal prosecution or other purposes, identifying protected activity that can be used against the interest of the principal, or developing information that can be exploited as leverage against the principal in interrogation or negotiation. Identification of the oppositions possible operational objectives is normally as simple as identifying potential adversaries and the purposes for which they might employ surveillance. Although surveillance detection is a worth-while practice as a standard security precaution even when no surveillance is suspected, a logically conceived perspective regarding protected information and activities that potential adversaries might seek to observe provides a degree of the focus to the effort.
Recall that with a fully integrated surveillance team, a number of seperate surveillance vehicles will observe the principal at different periods throughout the mbobile follow. This dictates that the principal concentrate not only on one or two propable vehicles, but any number of vehicles. Also recall that a comprehensive surveillance effort does not comprise only one trip or day in the life of the principal. This dictates that the principal remember for extended periods any vehicles he observes that fit the profile of a surveillance vehicle. For instance, if the principal observes a suspected surveillance vehicle and then observes it two weeks later at an unrelated location, he has virtually confirmed that he is under surveillance.
Convoying is an indicator of surveillance which is detectable on roadways that afford the principal a long look back at following traffic, such as highwas and rural roads. Convoing is the tendency for surveillance vehicles to maintain an equal distance between each other. Obviously this tendency is only detectable when the terrain allows the principal to observe more vehicles pass by. Streets with a long downward slope provide optimal terrain for observing for convoying vehicles and other indicators of vehicular surveillance. The characteristics of darkness which faciliate the observation of vehicle lights from a distance also enhance the detectionof convoying vehicles on appropriate terrain.
Both mobile and fixed progressive surveillance employ the concept of decision points, which are locations that give the principal the option to turn or continue straight. The most common decision points are street intersections. A fixed progressive surveillance operation is composed of static observation points established at designated decision points. Since this involves no surveillance assets traveling with the principal, few of the surveillance detection vulnerabilities addressed throughout this chapter exist. Again, the detection of fixed progressive surveillance is driven by the target pattern analysis process. The principal will identify possible decision points where fixed surveillance assets may be located. When approaching and passing through identified decision points, the principal will observe for vehicles or foot operators in fixed surveillance positions.
When traveling on a train or bus, the principal should observe all individuals for subsequent recognition. Many trains are compartmented, which will assist in the isolation of potential surveillance operators on the train are not limited to those traveling within observation range of the principal. Longer rides will give the principal more opportunities to identify individuals who may be giving him more attention than is warranted or appear conspicous in some other way.
In some circumstances a surveillance team may select to place a surveillance operator "up against" the principal. This refers to the tactic of actually having a surveillance operator establish contact and rapport with the principal, taking advantage of the natural occurence of chance contacts with strangers that is characteristic of such travels. This gives the "harmless stranger" an opportunity to gain exceptional insight into the principals demeanor. as well as eliciting information that may be of value to the surveillance team.
Active physical surveillance detection consists of specific, normally preplanned maneuvers executed by the principal to elicit a reaction from a surveillance asset. By orchestrating an unanticipated situation to which the surveillance asset must react, the principal isolated that asset for identification. As with passive detection, active physical surveillance detection is based on knowledge of how a surveillance team operates. Such an understanding allows the principal to employ active measures that will invoke compromising actions by surveillance assets.
Active surveillance detection will rarely expose surveillance with each maneuver. In most cases, the principal will at best develop specific indicators to focus on for observation and retention. For instance, although a surveillance detection maneuver may elicit a suspicous reaction from a nearby vehicle, it is normally not until that vehicle is observed subsequently at an incoincidential location that surveillance can be confirmed.
A surveillance team depends on communication for a secure and coordinated effort. Most operationally capable surveillance teams will depend on radio communications equipment during all aspects of its surveillance operations. The communications equipment a team may employ ranges from hand-held radios to discreetly installed vehicular communications systems. Regardless of the degree of sophistication, all radio communications systems transmit radio frequency signals into the atmopshere. Although in most cases this is a surveillance teams greatest vulnerability to detection, it must be accepted because of the importance of a communications capability.
The principal should acquire the equipment needed to capitalize on the vulnerabilities inherent in surveillance communications. Rather than getting involved with more sophisticated communications detection equipment, however, radio frequency scanners are all that should be necessary. A limitation of commercially purchased frequency scanners is that they are designed to monitor only those frequencies authorized by federal regulations. A surveillance team concerned with the vulnerability of communications to frequency scanners will operate on radio frequencies outside the range of standard scanning equipment. In fact, many federal restrictions regulating the use and monitoring of certain frequency ranges are in place to protect the security of law enforcement and intelligence operations such as surveillance.
Commercial frequency scanners can be modified to receive restricted frequencies with some research. This information is available in various electronics publications. Electronics enthusiasts with this and other knowledge are not difficult to find. It is worthwhile to establish a relationship with an employee of an electronics equipment business. Once one has established rapport, such individuals are excellent sources of information regarding technical equipment applications and the frequencies used in a given area for particular purposes.
Two frequency scanners are ideal for surveillance detection purposes. A fixed scanner should be used in the residence to monitor activity in the general vicinity. This is propably the most effective means of detecting surveillance communications because much of a surveillance operation is based around the principals residence. From this location the principal can discreetly dedicate the necessary time to scan the spectrum and identify communications activity of interest. He should also use a mobile scanner when travelling by vehicle. This is most effective when used to monitor frequencies or frequency ranges that have been identified to be of interest through fixed scanning efforts.
Surveillance teams may use encrypted communications to maintain the security of their acitivites. Encrypted, or encoded, communications are scrambled in a manner that restricts their reception to radios that are programmed to decrypt the transmissions. The technology does exist to decrypt scrambled transmissions, but such a capability is beyond the expertise and financial means of most people. Encrypted communications are effective in protecting specific information regarding a surveillance operation, but they are as vulnerable to detection as unsecured transmissions. When encrypted communications transmit over the radios frequency, only static can be received by a radio that is not programmed for decryption. Although this protects the actual details of the conversation, it does reveal the fact that the frequency is being used for communications.
In residential areas it is relatively easy to isolate possible observation post locations through the process of elimination. Although law enforcement or national investigative agencies may commission the cooperation of a neighbor to set up an observation post, this is rarely done. In a residential area where the principal knows the neighbors, or is at least aware of who resides at specific residences, it is easy to eliminate locations as possible observation posts. In apartment complexes or commercial areas, the principal should be able to identify a number of possible locations for observation posts. When he has done so, the prinicpal will begin to observe the observers.
Surveillance operators manning an observation post will remain concealed inside the location to avoid any exposure to the principal. Therefore, the principal may detect such locations based on their conspicious inacitvity. Any rooms of possible observation post that are illuminate at night can be eliminated. The principal should observe for specific rooms that remain concealed during the day. By eliminating some rooms and identifying others as possible observation post locations in this way, the principal can then focus on future detection practices.
The same surveillance operators cannot remain inside a constant observation post indefinitly. Eventually observation post teams will exchange duties, leaving themselves vulnerable to detection. This exchange will normally take place in the middle of the night, even when it may seem more likely that this would occur during the day when the principal is away. The reason for this is that the surveillance team is not only trying to avoid drawing the attention of the principal but also that of neighbors who may become suspicious of unusual activity.
More aggressive active measures to be employed in the detection of observation posts include the use of infrared-detecting equipment to determine wether the opposition is using infrared devices. Another active measure is to have an anonymous package delivered to a suspected location with instructions to leave it at the door if there is no answer. This action may draw a surveillance operator to the door for observation, but it is likely that surveillance operators will leave the package in place and remain concealed. The principal will then continue constant observation of the package because a surveillance operator will eventually emerge, propably under concealment of darkness, and remove the package to restore a more natural appearance to the observation post location.
Even more aggressive measures include reporting an emergency, such as a civil disturbance, at the suspected observation post location. Since this is illegal, the principal should ensure that the distress call cannot be traced to its origin. While emergency personnel respond, the principal will observe to identify individuals occupying the location. Regardless of the result, the surveillance team will consider its observation post compromised and depart. This departure will be done without panic, in a manner which would draw no attention, and again, it will propably take place under the concealment of darkness.
Mobile surveillance systems may be used as observation posts when there are no fixed structures available to provide sufficient cover. Mobile observation posts normally take the form of a passenger van similar to others common to the area. Observation post vans may also have an official designation or commercial wording on the exterior to provide a plausible reason for their being in a particualr area. Vans with distinctive wording can only serve a limited purpose, however, because their extended presence will eventually appear suspicious. Mobile observation posts may also be established out of campers or trucks. A standard vehicle with remotely monitored video equipment can also be positioned as an observation post.
A fully integrated mobile system will be equipped with observation, video, and photographic equipment. The equipment will be installed so that surveillance operators inside can monitor surrounding activity without physically observing out of the vehicle.
If the principal is fortunate enough to observe a driver parking a vehicle without ever departing, he will have confirmed surveillance.
A more aggressive detection measure to be employed is to report a suspected vehicle to law enforcement authorites.The call should be made so it cannot be traced to the principal in case the surveillance asset happens to be a law enforcement agencys. The principal will observe as police officers approach the vehicle, possibly forcing out the surveillance operators. If the vehicle is in fact a surveillance asset but passed the scrunity of the police inquiry, the team will nevertheless consider it compromised and move it at the first secure opportunity. If the vehicle moves without ever being approached - or at least driven past - by police officers, the principal has confirmed that it was a law enforcement agency observation post vehcle.
When the stakeout location is situated in an apartment complex, the surveillance team may have more flexibility and concealment with which to establish a trigger position. When the principal resides at a hotel, the surveillance team may position a trigger operator inside the lobby to provide it with early warning regrading the principals activity and to inform it of the exit by which he is departing. When residing at a hotel, the principal should observe for individuals in stationary positions in the lobby or other common areas.
A surveillance may also attempt to get a room next to or the same floor as the principals. Although this is normally done to support technical surveillance operations, the team will also use this placement as a trigger for the physcial surveillance stakeout. An aggressive detection method can be employed in this situation is for the principal to stand in the hallway for a period of time after he exits and locks his room, observing for other guests who depart their room shortly after he does and identifying their room number.
Another aggressive detection maneuver is to depart the possible stakeout location, circle the block, and either return to the location or pass by and continue with the planned travel. This is a very overt detection measure because there is little logical reason for such a maneuver. The fact that it confounds logic precisely why it is effective. When the surveillance team is determining box locations, it bases the positioning of operators on roads which it does not epect the principal to use. Normally it will select one of the streets on the side of the block the stakeout is covering as a secure position, for the very reason that the principal would not logically circle his own block. This applies to either the block which the target location is actually on or the one on the opposite side of the streets, whichever is determined to be the principals least likely route of departure. This maneuver also provides a good opportunity for the principal to observe a trigger vehicle still in the box position or beginning to maneuver as the principal passes back by.
In relation to aggressive driving, a principal who establishes a pattern of using expedient shortcuts such as ducking into back streets or cutting through parking lots to avoid traffic signals has more flexibility in conducting surveillance detection maneuvers. Additionally, the principal who establishes a pattern of violating traffic laws such as taking illegal left-hand turns or running red lights when no traffic is coming opens additional surveillance detection options.
At the other extreme is slow and conservative driving. The principal who drives in this manner inherits some surveillance detection advantages as well. Here too, if the principal drives in a slow and conservative manner, the surveillance team is forced to conform to this pattern as well. If the principal drives 5 miles per hour below the speed limit, he may upset a number of other vehicles, but he can easily isolate following vehicles that are maneuvering in a similar manner.
Propably the most effective vehicular surveillance detection maneuver is the logical 180-degree turn. Note the term logical, implying that the circumstances of the turn should appear plausible to an observing surveillance team, if present.
One terrain feature that faciliates surveillance detection on highways is a rest area or a similar location such as a state welcome area or highway-side service station. As the principal exits the highway and enters a rest area, he will observe to the rear for any vehicles that enter behind him. He can then take a position in the rest area to observe any vehicles that enter shortly aftre him. He will also observe the reactions of vehicles as he departs.
A final option when using a highway exit ramp for detection is to exit, pass over the highway, and then reenter traveling in the opposite direction. This is an interesting challenge to a surveillance team, because in order to cover the principal in a tactically sound manner, the team will have to expose at least two and possibly three surveillance vehicles.
Traveling by taxi does not preclude active surveillance detection. Passive observation is difficult because the principal will not have the range of mirrors normally available. He has little to lose, however, by asking the taxi driver to observe for indications of surveillance and that assistance in detection will be rewarded. Taxi drivers are generally good sources for observation because they are familiar with standard traffic patterns and can readily identify anything that appears suspicious. If the principal is particuarly concerned with the possibility of surveillance, he can instruct the taxi driver in surveillance detection maneuvers. This also provides a somewhat plausible reason for the use of overt tactics, because the surveillance team will likely attribute aggressive maneuvers to the erratic driving typical of cab drivers.
One important note for this and all other foot surveillance detection maneuvers is that when observing possible surveillance operators at close range, the principal should avoid making eye contact. Surveillance operators are generally paranoid about compromise, and eye contact with the principal is viewed as an extreme degree of exposure. In many cases a surveillance operator will pull himself out of the operation if eye contact with the principal occurs. This has a negative impact on the effectiveness of surveillance detection, because if the surveillance operator withdraws from the operation after the principal gets a good look at him, the principal loses the opportunity to observe him later and confirm surveillance.
Countersurveillance is very characteristic of intelligence and law enforcement agency activities. When intelligence operatives meet with their agents, they commonly employ the support of countersurveillance to ensure that their activities are not compromised or that their contact is not a double-agent. Intelligence agencies will also employ the support of countersurveillance when they suspect that an agent is under surveillance. If surveillance is detected during countersurveillance coverage, the agency will confirm that the agent is compromised and either discontinue contact or incoroporate more secure means of contact and control. Law enforcement agencies commonly employ countersurveillance to ensure the security of their agents during undercover operations such as narcotics buys.
An extension of countersurveillance coverage that is extremly sophisticated and complex involves emplying countersurveillance to isolate a suspected surveillance operator and then following that individual to confirm surveillance and determine his identity. This is an aggressive measure to detect surveillance at its source. Obviously, it requires that countersurveillance operators be tactically capable surveillance operators as well.
Any location that incorporates specific types of security measures is effective for antisurveillance. This is based primarily on the fact that a surveillance team is not only concerned with detection by the principal but also by third parties. Security personnel or systems provide the third party for antisurveillance purposes. Even a surveillance team that is operating under official authorization must be sensitive to compromise by well-intentioned security personnel. Security personnel are trained and employed to identify suspicious activity, rendering any surveillance team vulnerable to detection. Additionally, security systems such as X-ray machines and metal detectors will obstruct or delay the entry of surveillance operators with communications equipment or firearms. Through prior planning the principal can exploit such locations for antisurveillance purposes.
Music masking can be used to conceal audio leakage that is detected by an audio amplifier or other means. Audio can escape a target area via pipes, conduits, air ducts, or simply through walls. Music masking distorts audio leakage by transmitting music through a network of speakers placed close to the source leakage. Radio or commercially programmed music should not be used for masking, such as local radio station, the surveillance team can record the same radio station transmissions and use them to filter the masking music out of audio intercepts. Alternatives to the use of commercially programmed music that can be similarly acquired and used for filtering include compiling a tape of various songs that would be difficult to duplicate. Another option is the use of classical music, which, although readily indentifiable by compositions, is difficult to distinguish by artist or recording product.
The world around us is a dangerous and hostile one. Wether spy versus spy, target versus terrorist, or you against the world, the keys to survival are the same. Although the enemy may not be readily apparent, accepting the fact that the enemy is everpresent is paramount to the preservation of personal security.
The underworld of crime and espionage is the battleground of shadow warriors who have survived in the face of the most sophisticated and hostile elements imaginable. Theirs is a highly predatory and often vicious world, of which the greater society is oblivious. These men without faces, and faces without names, will continue to fade anonymously into history and become lost in time like tears in the rain. It is truly unforutnate that their unrecorded episodes of intrigue and human confrontation will follow them into obscurity.
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