TO ALL DISS-ON.ANTS AND DEFECT-OR.S..
CHECKMATE!
Militärpolizei Schweiz (also part of the swiss war-crime groups consisting mainly of non-human personnel and mostly seen in blue military cars):
http://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/organisation/fsta/mp.html
http://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/organisation/fsta/mp/mpreg4.html (Kantone AR, AI, GL, GR, SG, SH, TG und ZH - Management P-41?!)
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Kommando Militärische Sicherheit
Papiermühlestrasse 14
CH-3003 Bern
By ACM IV SECURITY SERVICES - PART II
Surveillance countermeasures are actions taken by an individual or security detail to identify the presence of surveillance, and if necessary, to elude or evade the individual or group conducting the surveillance.
The new reality of the contemporary environment is characterized by a wide range of unconstrained threats that reflect the ever-growing and pervasive underworld of dangerous actors. The plethora of acute threats to the personal privacy and security of average citizens consist of common criminals and stalkers, private and corporate investigators, government-sponsored espionage agencies, and international crime and terrorist organizations.
In fact, the criminal enterprises that traffic in everything from drugs to human beings, and terrorist organizations that recognize no bounds of conscience, epitomize the contemporary threats that do not acknowledge innocent bystanders and from whom no one is immune. As a disturbing omen, there is consensus among national security experts that the steady increase in threats to a wider range of individuals based on the disturbing trend of "pervasive insecurity" will continue well into the second quarter of the 21st century.
The spectrum of surveillance threats to personal security can range from surveillance operations with nonlethal intent to the most dangerous extreme: operations conducted in preparation for some type of physical attack.
At the most basic level, criminals will case potential targets to develop information to maximize their propability of success in committing a crime. Although not generally associated with sophisticated surveillance efforts, another common threat to the personal security of many is the stalker threat, which involves surveillance of an individual for any number of reasons-none of which are in the best interest of the target individual. Less sophisticated criminal threats will also employ surveillance to develop information on potential victims for incriminating or exploitable purposes, such as blackmail or coercion.
Criminal, terrorist, espionage, and various other more sophisticated elements employ surveillance to develop information on individuals they intend to intimidate, exploit, or terminate. At the lower end of this threat spectrum, surveillance is empoyed to develop exploitable information in efforts to recruit or coerce unwitting individuals to provide information or other types of support. Even people with no readily exploitable attributes can be manipulated into compromising situations to develop the leverage necessary for coercion. At the higher end of the lethality spectrum, terrorists, assassins, and other murderous elements conduct comprehensive preoperational surveillance to maximize the propability of successful attacks. In preparation for criminal or terrorist acts, surveillance is employed either to monitor a targets activity to determine where he is most vulnerable, or in preparation for the conduct of an actual attack.
Another factor that portends an enhanced threat across the spectrum is that surveillance capabilities that were traditionally associated only with government-sponsored intelligence and security agencies have proliferated widely. Organizations such as criminal, terrorist, and corporate-sponsored elements now have the resources to conduct sophisticated surveillance operations that were previously associated with only the most capable governments. The fact that these elements have training facilities and doctrinal manuals reflects a degree of sophistication that presents significant challenges to the community of security professionals.
The objectives and importance of surveillance countermeasures are based on the logical and time-tested assumption that individuals conduct surveillance of a target only in order to do that individual harm. Although the existence of a surveillance effort will always imply some degree of harmful intent, it is the threat of physical harm that most vividly highlights the importance of surveillance countermeasures. Even a random or spontaneous act of crime is preceded by detectable indications. The effective indentification of these indications could provide the time and opportunity to react in an evasive manner under life-or-death circumstances. In the case of the more deliberate and sophisticated physical threats such as terrorism, kidnapping, or assassination, the perpetrators will invariably conduct surveillance of the intended victim. In most cases, the surveillance efforts in preperation for these attacks can be readily detected, and in fact, post-event investigations of actual attacks regularly determine that there were detectable signs that the victims over-looked or disregarded due to a lack of security awareness.
The variations of surveillance detection tactics and techniques are virtually infinite, and essentially limited only by the imagination. Although a detailed explanation of surveillance detection maneuvers is beyond the scope of this manual, for perspective, typical examples consist of:
- Move into a turn lane or an exit ramp and then back into the general flow of traffic, observing for following verhicles that do the same.
- Cross over multiple lanes of traffic to make a turn or exit and observe for following vehicles that do the same.
- Drive into a highway exit, such as a rest stop, that enables the target to continue through without stopping, and reenter the highway while observing for following vehicles that do the same. Along city and other streets, there are many variations of this tactic that can be applied, such as through a strip mall or virtually any other parking lot that faciliates a smooth exit and reentry onto the main route.
- Cut through a parking lot to bypass a red light. This is also an effective antisurveillance measure against a security-concious surveillance effort.
- Cul-de.sacs and dead-end streets are propably the most extreme types of restrictive terrain where surveillance assets may be induced into compromising situations by mirroring the targets actions.
- The 180-degree-turn (reversal of direction) is perhaps the most effective surveillance detection technique. Just as the name implies, this maneuver involves the target reversing direction and retracing the route just traveled. From the surveillance detection standpoint, the 180-degree-turn is intended isolate potential surveillance assets and elicit a conspicious reaction. This maneuver enables the target to observe for potential surveillance assets that are forced to bypass the target, to observe for potential assets that hastily and conspiciously move from the route to avoid bypassing the target, and to observe for potential assets that execute a 180-degree-turn where the target did, or at some other location along the route.
- The "blind turn" or other tactics employing the concept of a "blind spot" are essentially efforts to manipulate a surveillance effort into mirroring the target in a manner that makes it susceptible to surveillance detection.
The box stage involves positioning surveillance assets to begin a mobile surveillance operation. This consists of positioning surveillance assets to begin the follow when the target emerges from a fixed location such a residence or workplace, or when the target stops temporarily during the course of a mobile surveillance follow. The box is based on the systematic positioning of surveillance assets around the area where the static target is located in order to prepare for a mobile surveillance follow when the target begins to move. The techniques of the surveillance box basically consist of the logical coverage of roads or routes by which the target can depart the fixed location. In some cases and based on target pattern analysis, a box may be established to travel through, rather than around the targets known or supsected static location.
Regardless of how many surveillance assets are employed in an operation at any given time there will always be at least one asset that maintains observation (contact) of the target. Intermittent losses of contact based on anticipating the targets actions, temporary blind spots, and exchanges between assets are normal. However, a surveillance effort will avoid letting the target go unobserved through options that would allow the target multiple alternative routes of travel, unless the effort will avoid were confident of the targets destination based on target pattern analysis or other means.
Any sophisticated surveillance effort operates based on an understanding of the principles of observation, and will conform to what should be perceived as the norm with respect to the surrounding environment. A surveillance effort must use cover and concealment to protect its activities from observation by the target. The term cover here is used in the classic espionage and investigative sense of cover for action, which simply means blending in with the surroundings to appear normal. Concealment can consist of a number of possibilities to include physical barriers, but generally, in a surveillance operation the primary method of cover and concealment for surveillance vehicles is other vehicles, and the primary method for surveillance operators on foot is the surrounding pedestrian traffic.
This prioritization process is a key concept because if there are not enough surveillance assets to cover all possible routes, then a corresponding number of routes will not be covered based on the assessment that the target is least likely to take these routes. If there is only one asset, that asset will need to be positioned in a location that will ensure that it can both observe the target is moving, and to position other available assets sequentially along the possible routes of departure as reinforcements.
When the target begins to emerge from a location where a surveillance effort would establish a box, if present, he will observe for indications of surveillance. In most cases, this will involve no active measures and will consist of passive surveillance detection. Observation for change detection purposes is most effective in areas where the target is very familiar with the normal surroundings, such as the neighborhood he lives in. The target will initially observe for vehicles or individuals who are conspiciously placed to act as a potential trigger. Unusually placed trucks, vans, or vehicles with tinted windows are particular indicators. As the target begins to move, he will observe for individuals or vehicles that conspiciously transition from a static to a mobile status.
Restricitive terrain is employed to isolate potential surveillance assets for surveillance detection purposes, and also to conduct or to posture for the execution of surveillance detection purposes, and also to conduct or to posture for the execution of surveillance detection and antisurveillance measures. The key enabling concept of restrictive terrain is that the target will force the surveillance effort into a situation that restricts its freedom of movement, making it vulnerable to surveillance countermeasures.
Although a significant enabler for surveillance countermeasures purposes, restrictive terrain is a true double-edged sword for the target who actually suspects surveillance, but does not know wether the intentions of the surveillance effort are lethal or nonlethal. This is a critical consideration when determining wether to employ these enablers, because in many cases the restrictive terrain that the target can exploit for surveillance countermeasures purposes would likely be the very same restrictive terrain that a hostile element would choose to execute an attack on the target, if that were the intent.
For surveillance countermeasures purposes, the exploitation of canalized terrain negates the ability for the surveillance effort to execute a secure floating box follow, and forces the surveillance effort to commit all its assets along a single route behind the target. Inducing the entire surveillance effort onto a single canalized route enhances surveillance detection through observable factors such as "convoying" by fanning out at the end of the corridor, through the execution surveillance detection tactics, the most effective (yet potentially overt) of which is the 180-degree-turn or reversal of direction. The exploitation of canalized terrain combined with a traffic hazard, choke point, or other type of obstacle becomes an effective antisurveillance measure.
Intrusion points are locations with a single primary point of entry and exit. Basically stated, an intrusion point is a location that forces surveillance assets either "intrude" upon the target in close proximately or break contact and await the targets exit from the location. Common intrusion points are dead-end roads and cul-de-sacs by vehicle, and small street-side business establishments by foot.
As it applies to vehicular surveillance, dead-end roads and cul-de-sacs are the extreme in terms of choke points because they completely restrict movement once committed. Again, restrictive terrain such as choke points will also serve to isolate the target with the surveillance effort, making the target extremely vulnerable to attack if that were the intent of the surveillance effort, or if the effort feels that it must act based on being compromised ("fight-or-flight").
By foot, intrusion points can be selected that enable the target to observe for potential surveillance operators who choose not to enter but rather linger outside awaiting the targets exit. Intrusion points with a secondary exit, such as a back door to a business, can be exploited to elude a surveillance effort, but such tactics would be readily perceived as overt antisurveillance measures.
Open terrain forces a surveillance effort to make a trade-off between line-of-sight observation and how closely it chooses to maintain contact with the target. For instance, if the surveillance effort chooses close contact over distance. it makes itself immediately vulnerable for detection. Alternatvively, the surveillance effort chooses close contact over distance itself for security purposes makes itself much more vulnerable to antisurveillance.
On foot, the target can use as much the same methodology to exploit canalized terrain and choke points as with vehicular surveillance countermeasures. Canalized terrain may consist of any restricted walkway, street overpasses, bridges, and even elevators or escalators if employed with caution. Canalized terrain may offer the target traveling on foot a natural opportunity to faciliate rear observation, but normally it will be exploited through the incorporation of a 180-degree-turn or a stop-and-turn.
The basic principles of surveillance in public places are similar to those of choke points and intrusion points, in that they force surveillance operators to concentrate and stagnate. The presence of restrictive boundaries and nonstandard terrain imposes unique constraints and vulnerabilities on surveillance operators. The nonstandard terrain works to the benefit of the target for surveillance detection purposes because it forces the surveillance effort to use special or modified tactics. In essence, public locations force a surveillance effort rely more on adaptability and resourcefullness than on a standard systematic formula of tactics, rendering surveillance assets more vulnerable.
In most circumstances, people on foot are moving with a purpose or destination. Those who are not are easily isolated from the surrounding populace. This is another key aspect of public locations that can be exploited for surveillance detection purposes. When individuals go into a public location, such as a store, they do so with a purpose. When surveillance operators follow the target into a public location, they must immediately contrive a plausible and natural reason for being in the location (cover for action), leaving them immediately vulnerable to detection if they are not able to adapt. In fact, the target can choose public locations that effectively isolate surveillance operators who enter but are not prepared to the surroundings. Locations with a standard dress code or in which clientel may be expected to dress in a particular manner or undertake a unique activity are very suitable if employed properly.
Its always important to note that surveillance operators will avoid making eye contact with the target because when this occurs, the asset is considered "burned" and of no further use to the surveillance effort. This phenomenon results in an almost instinctive or compulsive reflex in close quarters that is highly indicative of surveillance.
1. Surveillance countermeasures principle: the more active, the more effective.
In general, the more active (overt or aggressive) the surveillance detection or antisurveillance maneuver, the more effective it will be in achieving the desired result.
2. Surveillance countermeasures principle: surveillance detection enables antisurveillance.
Active surveillance detection techniques can be effective antisurveillance techniques.
3. Surveillance countermeasures principle: antisurveillance enables surveillance detection.
Antisurveillance techniques can also be very effective in achieving the objectives of surveillance detection.
Active surveillance detection and antisurveillance countermeasures are conducted along the range from covert to overt - hence the term the cover-overt spectrum. Covert surveillance countermeasures are executed discreetly and are intended to detect or elude a surveillance effort without being recognized as active countermeasures. Overt surveillance countermeasures are intended to detect or elude with less or no regard wether the surveillance effort detects them as such. In simple terms, the more covert the measure the less active it is, and the more overt the measure the more active it is.
Generally, the more covert or discreet the surveillance countermeasures technique, the less effective it will be in meeting immediate surveillance countermeasures goals. Conversely, the more overt or active the method the more effective it will be in meeting immediate surveillance countermeasures goals. Consequently, the more overt the method, the more identifiable it will be to a surveillance effort (if present) as surveillance countermeasures.
A final consideration in where along the covert-overt spectrum a surveillance countermeasure should be employed involves the classic fight-or-flight response. As with many factors surrounding the surveillance and countermeasures battle, there are a number of psychological factors that apply just as they do in the most savage expanses of the wild. The fight-or-flight response (also called the "acute stress response") simply means that an animal has two options when faced with danger: it can either face the threat (fight) or it can avoid the threat (flight).
Whenever a surveillance detection technique is addressed, this concept should be considered as well in order to determine the antisurveillance implications. Most surveillance efforts make operational security their highest priority, because if the target becomes aware of coverage, the surveillance effort is severely hindered or rendered completly ineffective. Any surveillance effort that places a higher priority on maintaining security than it does maintaining contact with the target will normally terminate the surveillance after observing the target execute a surveillance detection maneuver, rather than risk further compromise. Even the most subtle active surveillance detection maneuvers can "spook" a particularly sensitive surveillance effort. For example, with a highly security-concious surveillance effort, restrictive terrain may serve as an antisurveillance deterrent in and of itself, by forcing the effort to terminate contact rather than commit assets into a potentially compromising situation.
By way of summation, active surveillance detection techniques can place the surveillance effort in a position that forces it to either terminate the surveillance or risk compromise - making them effective antisurveillance techniques as well. However, this demonstrates that the intended technique ( surveillance detection) has an unintended result (antisurveillance). This also demonstrates that surveillance countermeasures that give the surveillance effort the ultimate choice ("terminate contact or risk exposure") are suboptimal. What is optimal is the employment of surveillance countermeasures processes that incoprorates techniques to manipulate and exploit, and can be executed in incremental stages that are more effective in achieving the desired results, while not being overtly identifiable as such.
Anitsurveillance is the most difficult surveillance countermeasure to conduct discreetly because the techniques are generally more aggressive and readily identifiable by a surveillance effort. Again, the more overt or active the antisurveillance maneuver, the more effective it will be in eluding or evading surveillance. However, against a determined and capable surveillance effort, only the very most overt techniques will be singularly effective in evasion.
This possible eventuality certainly demonstrates that surveillance countermeasures that give the surveillance effort the ultimate choice (terminate contact or risk exposure) are suboptimal. In this case, the target has given the surveillance effort the choice (or compelled it) to continue with the surveillance or pursuit rather than avoid compromise and detection. By conducting antisurveillance techniques that give the surveillance effort a choice (fight-or-flight), the target has orchestrated a situation that may lead to the most dangerous of unintended consequences.
The main point is that active surveillance countermeasures techniques should not be employed in isolation as an expedient, except when circumstances dictate that aggressive measures be employed based on immediate security concerns. Rather, active surveillance countermeasures techniques should be employed at the time and place of the targets choosing, and as a component of an integrated process.
These concepts establish the cornerstone for virtually all surveillance detection and antisurveillance tactics and techniques and are summarized as follows:
1. Surveillance Countermeasures Concept: Be Inconspicious
In most cases, and at least initially, it is to the targets advantage that the surveillance effort not suspect that the target is surveillance-concious or practicing surveillance countermeasures.
2. Surveillance Countermeasures Concept: Target Pattern Analysis
A surveillance effort conducts target pattern analysis to maximize the efficiency and security of the surveillance operation.
In mathematics and physics, Chaos Theory addresses the phenomena of how isolated events can destabilize systems. This theory is commonly referred as the "ripple effect", and is propably most popularly associated with the "butterfly effect", which suggests that the flapping of a butterflys wings might cause tiny changes in the atmosphere that ultimately cause a tornado to appear.
The psychological and physiological factors of confusion, anxiety, friction, inertia, and momentum apply to any surveillance operation. Ironically, even the majority of individuals categorized as "professional surveillance operators" are actually unaware of the advanced concepts that impact most surveillance operations. Such "professionals" understand that these dynamics occur, but have never conducted a critical analysis of the problem to identify the root causes and corrections. These factors that impact a surveillance operations based on confusion, inaction, or overreaction are addressed as they apply to The Chaos Theory of Surveillance which, if effectively exploited, is the ultimate manipulation of a surveillance effort for isolation, detection, or evasion purposes.
Within the surveillance professionals community, surveillance operations are affectionately characterized as hours of boredom periodically interrupted by moments of chaos.
This tongue-in-cheek characterization implies that even an unwitting target can cause a noteworthy degree of chaos for a surveillance effort. The hallmark of professional surveillance effort is its ability to react to and manage chaos. However, chaos that is deliberately created by a manipulative target can be virtually impossible for even the most capable surveillance efforts to manage. Consistent with the above characterization of a surveillance operation, the target can orchestrate moments of chaos to isolate, manipulate, and exploit surveillance assets - hence the term The Chaos Theory of Surveillance.
When the target conducts an unanticipated activity that is not consistent with target pattern analysis, the surveillance effort will likely assume that the unusual acitivity is potentially of very high operational interest, since it deviates from established norm. This professional instinct to ensure that contact is maintained while at the same time reacting to an unanticipated event - if effectively exploited - renders the surveillance effort vulnerable to isolation and detection. As a synergistic effect, the laws of psychology and physics can be exploited to cause a situation that is chaotic for the surveillance effort, yet controlled by the target.
There is no professional surveillance operator with street-level experience who would dispute that such a Chaos Theory exists. Virutally no "professionals", however, have ever examined the phenomenon in detail to understand the alpha and omega of this dynamic, though all have experienced it. This stands as another example of the art and science of surveillance countermeasures. Once again, tactical applications are standard fare, but an understanding of advanced concepts such as The Chaos Theory of Surveillance enables the target to enter, manipulate, and disrupt the hostile surveillance threats decision cycle and operational process. (repeatedly tested and confirmed effective)
Isolation techniques have three distinct isolation purposes:
1. Isolation techniques to identify potential surveillance assets.
2. Isolation techniques employed as an element of a surveillance detection procedure to detect or confirm a surveillance presence.
3. Isolation techniques employed as an element of an antisurveillance porcedure to evade or elude a surveillance presence.
The most effective procedures to exploit the potential assets involve using one or a combination of the following exploitation methods:
- Observe for retention and later comparison, or to compare with previously identified suspected assets.
- Elicit a compromising response.
- Execute a surveillance detection maneuver, or series of maneuvers, to elicit a compromising response.
This dynamic, referred to as pacing, is among the most exploitable from a surveillance countermeasures perspective. By gradually fluctuating the travel pattern by pace and positioning, the target can observe for vehicles or pedestrians that mirror the same pattern. When maneuvering aggressively through traffic, the target can observe for vehicles that are also traveling behind in a aggressive manner. Conversely, by traveling in a slow and conservative manner, the target can observe for vehicles that conform to this pattern as well.
Open terrain is exploited to negate cover and concealment, which in turn negates freedom of movement and serves to isolate surveillance assets for detection. Open terrain forces a surveillance effort to make a trade-off between line-of-sight observation and how closely it chooses close contact over distance. It makes itself immediately vulnerable to detection. The term "open terrain" as it applies to foot surveillance can also induce areas that negate cover, not necessarily by forcing operators into the open, but by forcing them into areas where they are denied a plausible "cover for action" and therefore stand out.
Any terrain obstacle that serves to canalized, condense, or otherwise restrict a surveillance effort can be effective in isolating assets. The most basic and common tactical employment is the "logical 180-degree-turn." This tactic is most effectively employed for surveillance detection purposes when the target has isolated potential surveillance assets in terrain that restricts their options to react in a natural and plausible manner when the maneuver is executed.
Having been isolated with limited options to react, surveillance assets will be forced to pass by the target head-on or - better yet from the surveillance detection perspective - be compelled to make a hasty and conspicious effort to avoid a head-on confrontation, which serves to virtually confirm surveillance.
The target can induce surveillance assets to either accelerate or decelerate, and then use that momentum against them for surveillance countermeasures purposes. By manipulating or controlling the pace to generate "negative momentum" to establish the preconditions for a break in contact. The application of pacing coupled with open terrain can establish among the most suitable conditions to effect a break in contact.
The transition from vehicle to foot surveillance is one of the most effective situations for effecting a break in contact. In fact, the option available by foot, particularly in crowded public locations, provide many opportunities to elude a surveillance effort. The transition from foot to vehicular surveillance involves the vulnerabilities addressed as they apply to the transition from a vehicular box to a follow, coupled with the difficulties involved with this transition. An effective chaos-inducing method is for the target to execute a stop that would require the surveillance effort to transition from a vehicular to foot status, and then force a transition back to vehicular surveillance while the surveillance effort is still in the process of executing the initial transition.
In the context of exploit and manipulate, this procedure involves the repetitive execution of two basic steps:
- Isolate (manipulate)
- Observe (exploit)
A surveillance detection route (SDR) is an advanced method of surveillance detection that is performed to induce a surveillance effort into mirroring the targets broad movements in a manner that fasciliates the isolation and multiple sightings of surveillance assets. Wether developed graphically on a map or mentally, the SDR applies the understanding of surveillance detection concepts and principles planned maneuvers along a given route.
Of particular note, the relationship between The Chaos Theory of Surveillance and the temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure is tantamount to applying theory to practice. Recall that if not for the serious nature of a potentially hostile surveillance effort, the target could exercise elements of the Chaos Theory to "toy with" (manipulate) a surveillance effort. There is no other application that better reflects the characterization of "toy with" than the temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure, as it can truly make the traget a "master of puppets" in regard to potential surveillance assets. Like no other surveillance detection procedure, this one manipulates the surveillance effort in a manner that transforms it from the hunter to the hunted.
Summarized as follows:
- Isolate (manipulate)
- Break in contact (manipulate)
- Isolate (manipulate)
- Observe (exploit)
- Directed action (exploit) as necessary
- Observe (exploit) if directed action is employed
When placed in a situation that risks losing contact with the target, a surveillance effort wil take aggressive, and sometimes extreme measures to regain contact with the target.
The avoid lost contact concept makes the temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure effective. Like no other concept, this is the one that truly plays on the "psyche" of a surveillance effort. Understanding that surveillance assets will react in an aggressive and potentially compromising manner to avoid a "lost contact" situation is a priceless perspective as it applies to surveillance detection.
The concept of "avoid lost contact" is a significant element of the mastery of surveillance detection tradecraft. This level of insight enables the target to essentially assume control of a situation by simply exploiting the psychological impact that individual instances of lost contact have on a surveillance effort. From the team (peer) perspective, an individual surveillance operator who is responsible for allowing a lost contact situation that results in a lost contact drill has essentially failed himself and his team. The psychological motivation to avoid this fate alone generates the "inertia" and "momentum" that drive surveillance assets into positions of isolation within the targets range of observation. Even a surveillance effort involving only one operator shares this psychological impact of the desire to avoid failure.
The age-old tactic of turning a "blind corner" and then waiting for the surprised surveillance asset to find himself face to face with the target is a classic example of a temporary break in contact that is ageless as intrigue and espionage. Although it can be perceived as an overt surveillance countermeasures method if not properly executed, this basic tactical application is among the very most effective surveillance detection methods, and also serves as a good example of the elements of a temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure. These elements are:
- Isolate in preparation for a break in contact (manipulate).
- Effect a break in contact (manipulate).
- Find a "blind spot" and isolate the surveillance assets when they appear and regain contact (manipulate).
- Observe for compromising actions (exploit).
- Execute a surveillance detection maneuver (or series of maneuvers) to elicit a compromising response (exploit as necessary).
- Observe for compromising actions (exploit) if surveillance detection maneuvers executed.
In many cases, the fact that the surveillance asset suddenly finds itself in a vulnerable position is enough to elicit a compromising reaction. This can be accomplished by simply isolating a surveillance asset in a situation where it feels compelled to react hastily to avoid detection. If isolation alone does not sufficiently compromise the potential asset, it still serves to isolate the asset in order to focus the more active, overt, or aggressive detection maneuvers. Once surveillance assets are isolated, an immediate surveillance detection maneuver will be directed against the suspected surveillance asset to elicit a compromising reaction and confirm it as such. This constitutes the one-two punch that will normally force even the most savvy and composed surveillance professionals to flinch in a detectable manner.
As it applies to Chaos Theory, the psychological aspects of fear will very often override any consideration regarding being compromised as a surveillance asset. Such aspects range from the fear of detention to the fear of physical harm. While such directed surveillance detection methods are relatively overt and aggressive, they can still be executed in a plausible manner if incorporated with some type of logical follow-through. For example, the target can act in a manner that indicated that he is moving toward a confrontation with a potential surveillance asset, but then continue the feign to a logical conclusion that falls short of, or bypasses, the surveillance asset. From the surveillance detection perspective, this approach is the one that best characterizes the concept of reducing the hunter to the hunted, but the antisurveillance procedure takes this concept to its extreme manifestation.
The most effective technique to this end is the break and disappear antisurveillance procedure, which is based on an understanding of how a surveillance effort thinks and reacts. This procedure is a much more effective alternative to individual antisurveillance tactics that may be effective in breaking contact but are ineffective in disguising the employment of antisurveillance activities. The break and disappear enables the target to elude and evade a surveillance effort by executing the technique in a more subtle multistage approach, as opposed to a single covert maneuver. This is most effective as it involves orchestrating a plausible break and disappear antisurveillance procedure can be summarize as follows:
- Isolate (manipulate).
- Break in contact (manipulate).
- Employ reverse logic (manipulate).
- Evade (exploit).
- Disappear (exploit).
The most effectiv antisurveillance techniques involve breaking contact, enabled by measures that restrict the surveillance efforts freedom of movement as appropriate, and then manipulating the understanding of how a surveillance effort will attempt to regain contact after the target is lost.
The term "neutralization" has a number of meanings, but as it applies to the temporary break in contact antisurveillance procedure, by neutralizing the surveillance effort the target renders the effort no longer capable of continuing the surveillance. This procedure is designed and intended to force decisive confrontation with the surveillance effort that will terminate the hostile surveillance threat. Potential confrontation may consist of verbal warnings by the target, or the procedure may involve the orchestration of a confrontation with law enforcement elements. Of course, more aggressive confrontations may involve shooting out the tires on surveillance vehicles, sending another type of life-threatening message to surveillance assets such as warning shots, or to the extreme, which is to neutralize the surveillance effort in the most decisive and conclusive manner. Regardless of the method of neutralization employed, this is the surveillance countermeasures procedure that definately "reduces the hunter to the hunted".
The manipulation stage of this procedure is identical to the temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure and consists of the following three elements:
- Isolate in preparation for break in contact (manipulate).
- Effect a break in contact (manipulate).
- Find a blind spot to isolate the surveillance assets when they appear and reagain contact (manipulate.)
Just as the aspects of manipulation are employed in the temporary break in contact surveillance detection procedure to achieve a degree of surprise that renders surveillance assets susceptible to detection, the same techniques of isolation and manipulation should be employed with this procedure to ensure that the surveillance effort is as surprised and poorly prepared for the confrontation as possible. Drawing an unsuspecting surveillance effort into an intrusion point is the most extreme measure of manipulation for neutralization purposes.
This stage consists of one step:
- Neutralization (exploit).
The target or security detail will only plan to execute a measure of neutralization that he or they are fully prepared for and capable of executing. The techniques executed in the manipulation stage of the procedure will give the target an immediate advantage over the surveillance efforts assets, but the neutralization technique must be decisive and precise, because this advantage may only be momentary against a capable element that is prepared to rapidly assume the "fight". As opposed to the other surveillance countermeasures procedures, the range of potential neutralization techniques is more finite, with the final in a succession of escalating options being "extreme prejudice".
Although such applications are rare and exercised only in the most extreme circumstances, this procedure does epitomize the concept of "reducing the hunter to the hunted". As a testament to the Chaos Theory of Surveillance, the execution of this procedure with the integration of chaos-inducing techniques is antisurveillance in its purest form, as it immediately, decisively, and without indication terminates the surveillance threat - game over, and they never saw it coming ....
